A small spark could ignite a massive conflagration, and the entire world could readily become involved. Smaller nations had ambitions as well, and played off the Great Powers to assist in advancing them. It also locked nations into time-sensitive mobilization plans, wherein speedy deployment could lead to victory and tardy deployment to defeat.īy the early Twentieth Century, European powers had organized themselves into two competing security structures, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. This in turn contributed to militarism, an inclination to resolve quarrels by force. Competing militaries adopted such reforms as trained conscript armies, military use of railroads and telegraphs, modernized weapons delivered by a military industrial base, and centralized general staffs. Meanwhile, the world as a whole become more interconnected and interdependent than it had ever been. By December, France had won back nearly all the territory it had lost in February.Throughout the Nineteenth Century, the Great Powers of Europe were beset by national and imperial rivalries. It would be another four months before the conflict ceased. Falkenhayn's successors, Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, upheld the decision to suspend attacks at Verdun, but Germany defended its new positions there. Falkenhayn eventually halted the offensive in July.īut in August, with Germany and Austria-Hungary facing synchronised Allied summer offensives, Falkenhayn tendered his resignation. Some commanders, such as the Kaiser's son, Crown Prince Wilhelm, wanted attacks to cease, while others encouraged Falkenhayn to reapply pressure. Without a clear strategy, there was confusion about how to conduct the offensive.Īs the conflict wore on, division within the top ranks of the German army became apparent. General Falkenhayn was notoriously secretive and shared very little with his staff about his strategy or aims for the battle.Īs a result, German commanders had different objectives, ranging from capturing the town of Verdun to destroying the French army. Germany accumulated huge losses and gained little territory, leading it to throw more and more men into the conflict: Verdun soon became a battle of prestige for the Germans, as well as the French. He used many more divisions than planned. The two campaigns together should have brought France and Britain to terms.īut Falkenhayn's plan for an attack that would economise on German resources failed to work out as he had expected. Falkenhayn hoped to combine the Verdun offensive with a U-Boat offensive against British shipping. He planned to use a relatively small number of men to capture the high ground to the north of Verdun and then to inflict enormous casualties on the French using his superior German artillery to halt their counter-attacks. Britain was Germany’s most formidable military foe, but remained out of reach across the Channel. Britain via Verdunįalkenhayn was convinced by 1916 that the war could only be won on the Western Front. He intended the Verdun offensive to be an attrition battle to bleed France to death. Falkenhayn believed that the French would ‘throw in every man they have’ to retain Verdun to prevent national humiliation. He hoped that France would “throw in every man they have” to defend it, draining its army of resources. 3 It WAS INTENDED TO BE A BATTLE Of Attrition. General Erich von Falkenhayn, the Chief of the General Staff and Germany’s principal strategist, targeted the French town of Verdun because of its position on the Allied line and its sentimental value to the French people.
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